THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND FUTURE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

Year
2002
Author(s)
Steven P. Kadner - Canberra Aquila, Inc.
Elizabeth A. Turpen - The Henry L. Stimson Center
Abstract
Although experts have proposed that the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs provide the roadmap for future U.S.-Russia disarmament, finalization of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) within an evolving strategic environment requires a renewed assessment of the role CTR could play in the coming years. Over the past ten years, the CTR programs have achieved a credible track record in contributing to the mutual disarmament and nonproliferation objectives of the U.S. and Russia. However, the objectives of the CTR programs -- whether focused on weapons, materials or know-how -- were clearly framed within a rigid, formulaic Treaty-based strategic environment. The question remains whether the concept and tools of Cooperative Threat Reduction can be refined and expanded so as to achieve the necessary transparency and predictability to achieve stability within the context of a fluid strategic environment. The January 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review offers an interesting starting point from which to explore what issues must first be addressed before CTR can be proposed as a viable substitute for a rigid, treatybased framework and what areas CTR programs would be required to address. Not only does the NPR offer a basis for analyzing the role of CTR, but the recent Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed in Moscow indicates the difficult terrain to be navigated in order for CTR programs to achieve the desired objectives within the new strategic framework. These issues include: the lack of detail and flexibility afforded in the existing bilateral commitment; U.S. plans to shelve, not dismantle, large numbers of strategic weapons; the decreasing levels of weapons stockpiles which give rise to increasing pressure to address socalled asymmetries; the potential need to count warheads rather than delivery vehicles; and the CTR approach of purchasing transparency and access as opposed to reciprocal verification in a traditional arms control framework. While many details of the Nuclear Posture Review and the evolution of the new framework are still unclear, this analysis makes concrete recommendations regarding the foremost priorities for threat reduction programs in the near future.