National Means and Methods in Post-Cold War Verification and Compliance

Many current paradigms on verification were formed as a product of the bipolar tensions of the Cold War period and the perceived aims of the parties involved. However it appears that little has been written on how the changes in world power in the last decade may have affected these paradigms. While in previous decades national technical means was largely the provenance of the United States, the current spread of commerciallyavailable technologies and open source information has changed the balance of power in this area. Simultaneously, the diffusion of dual-use equipment and knowledge, wider understanding of national surveillance technologies, and the determination and ideology of potential nuclear weapons states has complicated the role of national means and methods and traditional confidence building measures in a post-Cold War world. Future inspection regimes will be challenged to detect noncompliance in an environment which in many ways may be more challenging than in the past. Complicating this will be resistance to intrusive inspections, challenges of state sovereignty and protests against unilateral verification. In analyzing these challenges, I first construct a foundation through political and international relations theory, examining under what conditions states choose cooperation or defection in arms control agreements. I utilize these theories in examining success or failure in applicable past agreements, the means and methods employed to determine compliance, and the effect of verifiability on cooperation and confidence building. Finally, I discuss possible future strategies for verification and compliance built upon traditionally successful practices and strategies.