Year
2000
Abstract
Negotiations on nuclear weapons have always been difficult, even after the end of the Cold War. Concerns about security, stability and prestige remain very high. To ease these hurdles, it is necessary to create pragmatic ways to help the implementation of a potential agreement. In the case of dismantlement, it is necessary to associate closely the nuclear civilian industry to the process, in order to create a \"satisfying environment for implementation\". With the ratification of START II and the CTBT by the Duma, followed by the June 2000 agreement on the dismantlement of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium, the arms control process has been reactivated. The way to a START III agreement has been reopened. But an excessive optimism would bemisleading. Firstly, because the implementation of START II has been put under the condition of the continuing existence of the 1972 ABM treaty ; secondly, because START III will generate new amounts of Wg PU (around 15 to 20 tons). By the year 2008, the plutonium in excess could reach other 35 tons. This perspective could create a stalemate in negotiations. As a result, Russia would continue new t o keep around 70 tons of Wg Pu for its strategic and 2 tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, it would increase the concerns about the risks of illegal transfer and proliferation of all kinds. Therefore, it is a priority to create a new dynamic, both in the United States and the European Union, in order to improve the industrial environment and increase the envisaged fundings. Since Russia refuse to consider its Wg Pu a waste, but sees it as a potential source of commercial resources, It should be presented with solutions, such as Mox, that step by step, will help its integration in the legal market of nuclear civilian industry. A special effort is needed which is affordable at a minimum level which has been accepted in the case of North Korea leading to the KEDO. Is European security worth less than the stability in the Korean peninsula ?