Year
2014
Abstract
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Department of Safeguards has stated that it seeks to “further evolve its safeguards system to become fully information driven in order to optimize the use of IAEA resources for meeting safeguards objectives.” 1 Los Alamos National La boratory (LANL) under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) sponsored the development of a State - level approach (SLA) and annual implementation plan (AIP) for a hypothetical advanced nuclear State as a means to evaluate a proposed LANL process f or SLA development. The analysis assumed that the State had a relatively extensive fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing capability, and extensive nuclear power plants. The impact of various State - Specific Factors (SSFs) was also consid ered. The study examined the use of acquisition pathway analysis in: developing a SLA and AIP ; maximizing the utility of the P hysical M odel; and supporting resource allocation decisions through a path prioritization. T his study looks at: (1) basing safegua rds resource allocation decisions not on a priori assumptions about a State’s intent to proliferate , but rather on its behavior (e.g., transparency, cooperation, etc.); and (2) prioritizing proliferation pathways instead of making subjective judgments abo ut States themselves. The study makes use of concrete examples in order to illustrate how new concepts and approaches could be implemented, and how they differ from more traditional safeguards approaches. The results show that safeguards implementation in an advanced State can change from traditional INFCIRC/153 safeguards with the State and the IAEA cooperating to implement unattended and remote monitoring, randomized and short notice inspections, effective and early reporting on fuel cycle and nuclear mat erial accountancy, while capitalizing on a strong State System of Accounting and Control and the authorities provided by the Additional Protocol.