THE TRILATERAL INITIATIVE: THE INITIAL CHARGE AND WHAT FOLLOWS

In September of 1996, the Russian Federation, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency joined together to investigate the technical, legal and financial issues that would arise if the IAEA were to be assigned responsibility for verifying weapon-origin fissile material released from military programs. The initial focus anticipated that warhead components might be submitted to verification, that would allow such an endeavor to begin earlier and encompass far greater amounts of such material than if verification waits for the classified properties materials to be blended away. Following six years and 93 trilateral meetings, the initial charge entrusted to the Initiative was concluded. The three parties agreed that the verification methods developed under the Initiative could be used by the IAEA to verify any form of fissile material without divulging classified information relating to the design or manufacture of nuclear weapons. In addition, a new legal framework was developed for such a verification mission. The focus has now shifted to the context of the bilateral Russian-US Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. The PMDA was signed in the summer of 2000. Its provisions include IAEA verification, and the fissile materials include those previously considered in the first phase of the Trilateral Initiative. This paper will summarize the accomplishments of the work carried out under the initial charge, a new mandate for continuing work, the progress to date and the expectations over the next year.