Year
2002
Abstract
As a result of events of September 11, 2001, increased scrutiny is being given to border security as well as cross-border trade. One area receiving considerable attention is the security aspects of bulk shipments of commodities and also high-value products, such as computer parts.2 While a number of shipment modalities exist, the one which is most difficult to address using conventional security techniques is multi-modal container shipments, more commonly known as sea containers or as \"cans\" by the trucking industry. The primary problem to be faced is one of sheer numbers of containers involved on a dayto- day basis.3 This volume problem is further complicated by the fact that container shipment is a highly-optimized method of movement from Point A to Point B. In most cases, it is impossible to access a container for inspection once it is placed on a ship or in a storage configuration. In addition to the inspection-related problems, an ominous fact is that a container is capable of carrying over 25 tons of cargo and for all practical purposes is a \"black box\". None but the more determined inspection team can gain access to its contents. Given this state of affairs, a number of concerns have been brought forward. It is recognized that containers can operate as a low-cost and highly efficient delivery vehicle for a large number of threats, including WMD. In recognition of this problem, a number of mitigating measures have been proposed whereby new technologies would be able to examine the container contents for threat probability using NDA means.4 Current proposals to utilize these tools at or near the points of arrival represent palliative actions, which have some flaws, even in their own terms.5 That is, once the container reaches port, it has already fulfilled its delivery-vehicle mission, particularly when it is considered that most large cities have port facilities which accept direct container traffic, and that airborne particles from unforeseen threats can potentially contaminate a wide area. As a follow-on to work that we have been conducting in the area of Customs data collection and border management, we have expanded the approach to include a method of providing \"continuity of knowledge\" of containers from initial loading to final unloading. This technical system for continuity of knowledge is coupled with human cargo assurance systems.6 It is maintained through real-time satellite-based monitoring and employs a trusted inspectorate, realtime monitoring of the inspectorate function and activities, advanced satellite communications technology, advanced sensor technology and finally, an IT infrastructure that automatically monitors and reports on the flow of traffic. An important consideration accounted for in conceptualizing the system design is the commercial application of the system as a means of providing improved cargo assurance and the prevention of loss through theft, damage or wrong routing.7 This consideration is paramount if the overall system is to be sustainable. While the commercial advantages of such a system are great, this requirement also places very strict limits on system capital and operating costs. In fact, the system cost per container may appear unrealistically low when compared to costs typically associated with other fields where continuity of knowledge is required. Despite this need for very low pricing, the large number of containers involved makes the cost target feasible to achieve, coupled with the fact that satellitebased system costs decline with every added user. The balance of this paper presents the basic description of the continuity of knowledge system (CKS) and describes tests which are ongoing in both North America and Europe. Given the nature of the scenarios being discussed, this paper does not present details of the technology used in CKS implementation. Interested parties are welcome to contact the author should additional information be of interest.