Year
2001
Abstract
The design and application of remote monitoring systems for material control and accountability at defense nuclear sites poses some unique challenges. Department of Energy (DOE) guidelines allow the use of electronic monitoring and surveillance equipment as a means of reducing the frequency of physical inventories of controlled items in storage. Monitoring system data that describes the location and secure status of items in storage, if unclassified or declassified, have the potential to be used for verification of compliance with bi-lateral arms reduction and material control agreements. Although such a verification regime does not currently exist, the potential impact and compliance requirements of future treaties and transparency agreements should be considered in the design, development, and cost/benefit/risk assessment of monitoring technology for nuclear material accountability at defense sites. In this paper, we describe the design and evaluation of a \"dual-use\" remote monitoring system for monitored storage of nuclear weapon components under a hypothetical arms control transparency regime. Control of sensitive information, data security and authenticity, and operational impacts associated with dual-use technology are discussed.