Year
2016
Abstract
The potential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in verification of future nuclear disarmament agreements has attracted significant attention. In contrast, there has been relatively little discussion of how experience in implementing IAEA safeguards could inform the development of verification and compliance provisions of future nuclear disarmament agreements. This paper will discuss some general features in the structure and implementation of IAEA safeguards and experiences relevant to the design of future verification regimes. One important feature of IAEA safeguards has been their flexibility. IAEA safeguards authorities are defined in general terms, leaving many implementation details to be defined by the IAEA Secretariat or to be worked out between the IAEA and the State. This has enabled safeguards to evolve in response to changing circumstances, whether those changes are technical (e.g. new nuclear fuel cycle or verification technologies) or legal (new treaties or new types of safeguards agreement). In the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the objective of safeguards is not only to detect significant diversion or other noncompliance, but also to deter such action through the risk of early detection. As multiple cases of noncompliance demonstrate, safeguards have been only partially effective in this deterrent role. In several instances since 1990, the IAEA has gone beyond routine safeguards implementation by undertaking investigations of nuclear activities in particular States. These investigations have typically relied on ad hoc cooperation between the IAEA and the State, and typically focused on general questions of compliance rather than the diversion of significant quantities of declared nuclear material. This experience provides important examples of the critical role of IAEA safeguards in identifying and resolving implementation and compliance questions.