Year
2001
Abstract
Since the mid-90’s, U.S. Government (USG) programs have struggled with obtaining access at foreign facilities. Requirements for access in several Department of Energy programs, while necessary, overly focused on the need for assurance that U.S. funding was being spent appropriately and that equipment was present and being used for its intended purpose. This initial stage of access as an audit function has rarely moved toward a regime that should be focused on compliance with bilateral and international agreements and treaty obligations. The use of verification technology to confirm compliance and acceptable performance can be refocused as a system of access monitoring either from remote locations or by mobile units present outside a sensitive or restricted facility. These systems can be used and expanded to address not only nuclear facilities, but perhaps also address the increasing need for verification or even inspections at chemical weapons sites and biological weapons facilities. Aquila Technologies Group (“Aquila”), Canberra Industries, Hi-G-Tek in Israel, Dr. Neumann Elektronik Gmbh in Germany, the General Physics Institute in Moscow, and various other commercial firms have collaborated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and U.S. and foreign government agencies to develop cutting edge safeguards technologies. Recent breakthroughs in safeguards instrumentation point to the possibility of applying these technologies to difficult situations in countries where access to facilities could be interpreted as a compromise of national security. This paper will discuss possible solutions to facility access, focusing on the equipment and operations rather than on-site inspections.