Enhancing Nuclear Safeguards and Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Goals and Objectives

States in the Asia Pacific are among those most progressively engaged in employing nuclear technology for energy and other applications. The region features many aspiring newcomer states, some with aggressive future development plans, a large installed capacity base, facilities spanning almost all facets of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, and advanced technology development programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies nuclear material safeguards to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear technology; states in the region thus depend on the IAEA system as a trusted third party for the assurance of favorable safeguards “conclusions” concerning other states. However, the compliance-based IAEA system does not provide for sharing relevant information with other member states. Direct sharing of information among states would enable them both (1) to assess independently the veracity of the IAEA conclusion, and (2) to address specific questions or issues of concern. Either of these goals would complement existing IAEA safeguards and strengthen assurances of nonproliferation in the region. For many reasons, the IAEA should not or cannot be the conduit for direct interaction between states in the region. Similarly, sharing information about nuclear security, such as best practices or lessons learned, faces challenges in the Asia Pacific. In the absence of binding international standards, systematic international inspections, or an international system for reporting and accountability, there is currently no channel for such information sharing. Some other mechanism is necessary, whether through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, formal or informal, routine or ad hoc, employing remote provision or involving scheduled visits, etc. The objectives for such voluntary cooperation, whatever particular approach might be taken, are: (1) define the specific subject, need and scope of interest, (2) identify the parties and authorities involved, (3) describe what is desired from a cooperative engagement and how it may be executed, (4) explore any associated risks and how they can be mitigated. And though ad hoc, voluntary cooperation in nuclear safeguards and security has increased confidence in the Asia Pacific region, more formalized efforts may be needed to achieve transparency, confidence building measures, and assurances. Despite the challenges, current activities are underway to enhance nuclear safeguards and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region through information sharing and coordinated activities. This paper will explore the goals and objectives of enhancing such cooperation, how doing so may strengthen nonproliferation assurances, and some possible approaches.