Opportunities for Mutual Reinforcement of International Safeguards and Export Control Regimes

Currently international safeguards and export controls are implemented largely as separate vehicles to achieving adequate oversight on production, transfers and use of nuclear materials, technology and equipment. Within the nuclear fuel cycle the primary role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards is to detect the diversion of nuclear materials to possible weapons applications. Expanded safeguards under the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) require states to report import and exports of some nuclear equipment and technologies. The AP has thus effectively expanded the role of the IAEA to include some responsibilities common to export control institutions. Export control activities focus on the monitoring of exchanges of materials, equipment and technologies between nations to reduce the risk that such exchange would facilitate the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The export control regime consists of internationally accepted norms for protecting key enabling technologies and equipment. These norms are wholly voluntary and the enforcement of such is a function of state regulations and administration, with the concept of non-interference in commercial activity. International safeguards and export controls share common points of overlap, or intersection, throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. However, it is clear that even with such intersections gaps exist in the chain of custody throughout the life cycle of nuclear materials, technology and equipment. This paper will illustrate these gaps in application of either safeguards or export control and present opportunities for safeguards enhancement in order to facilitate the application of export controls. Likewise, this paper will explore how the expanded application of export controls have the capacity to reinforce international safeguards.