SITE-LEVEL SAFEGUARDS APPROACHES

The Agency is undergoing a re-orientation from facility-based safeguards based on INFCIRC/153 toward State-level evaluation and analysis supported by additional state declared information and enhanced access afforded by INFCIRC/540. INFCIRC/540 brings with it the concept of “site”, which goes beyond individual facilities to include co-located facilities and related buildings and structures and their functional relationships. The complex interactions of facilities on larger sites indicate the need to establish safeguards approaches at the site-level. Site-level safeguards approaches would provide flexibility in Safeguards implementation and enhance the credibility of the safeguards system. Flexibility would arise from the Agency’s ability to efficiently target its verification activities to the most significant aspects of operations on a site. Enhanced credibility would arise from utilization of full information about the nuclear and related activities taking place on the site as a basis for inspections on short notice and complementary access, thereby strengthening the Agency’s capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. Site-level approaches would constitute building blocks in the integrated safeguards State level approach. Full information about site activities would be drawn from: expanded declarations under the Additional Protocol (AP); advance notifications by the State about nuclear material flow; advance notifications of specified operational activities on a site; and on-going collection and analysis of information from other sources available to the Agency, including satellite imagery. Among other safeguards measures to be implemented are: unannounced inspections, inspections on short notice, complementary access; randomised verifications of strata in facilities and buildings present on a site; and enhanced cooperation with SSACs. Site-level approaches would also be applicable to States without an AP in force and would provide advantages over facility specific safeguards approaches particularly in paving the way toward implementation of the AP, but would of course be limited by the lack of an AP declaration and the lack of complementary access. Within the Division of Safeguards Operations A practical steps have already been taken to reorganize according to fuel cycle stages and sites. Site officer responsibilities have been defined assigned. Preparations are on-going to develop methodologies for evaluation.