Nuclear Energy in the Transition to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

This paper examines how civilian nuclear energy can best be managed and safeguarded in the transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Clearly, whatever the specific fuel-cycle configuration, possession of civilian nuclear power would shorten the time required for a country to break out of a disarmament agreement and produce some or many nuclear weapons. By the same token, such possession also would allow a more rapid deployment or redeployment of nuclear weapson by a country wishing to respond to the breakout country. The existence of a civilian nuclear program would probably also make more possible, though still difficult, a clandestine program to produce nuclear explosive material, which if successful could shorten the time for the international community to react against a country breakout. The paper sets out preliminary estimates of the times required for a state to acquire, overtly and clandestinely,a few to many nuclear weapons if there is no civilian nuclear power program in the country; and it compares thse times to those possible under different technical fuel-cycle configurations and various multi-national and intenational agreements overseeing the fuel cycle if there is civilian nuclear power.