Preparing for the Entry-into-Force of the U.S. Additional Protocol at the National Security Laboratories1

On January 6, 2009, the United States became the last of the NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states to have an Additional Protocol (AP) enter into force (EIF), a decision made by then-President George W. Bush, who signed the U.S. AP on December 30, 2008. Although just a week passed between the President’s decision to sign the document and EIF via deposit with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the fact is that the United States had been preparing to comply with the AP for several years. Like the standard Additional Protocols negotiated with non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT, and unlike those of some nuclear weapons states, the U.S. Additional Protocol includes provisions for a detailed expanded declaration (Article 2) and for Complementary Access (Articles 4-6) to additional locations and information. For that reason, considerable effort was devoted to preparing U.S. equities to implement the AP and assure government stakeholders that national security information would not be “at risk.” Within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), nowhere was this more evident than across the Department of Energy’s (DOE) network of national laboratories, particularly among the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) national security laboratories – Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). On January 6, 2009, the United States became the last of the NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states to have an Additional Protocol (AP) enter into force (EIF), a decision made by then-President George W. Bush, who signed the U.S. AP on December 30, 2008. Although just a week passed between the President’s decision to sign the document and EIF via deposit with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the fact is that the United States had been preparing to comply with the AP for several years. Like the standard Additional Protocols negotiated with non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT, and unlike those of some nuclear weapons states, the U.S. Additional Protocol includes provisions for a detailed expanded declaration (Article 2) and for Complementary Access (Articles 4-6) to additional locations and information. For that reason, considerable effort was devoted to preparing U.S. equities to implement the AP and assure government stakeholders that national security information would not be “at risk.” Within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), nowhere was this more evident than across the Department of Energy’s (DOE) network of national laboratories, particularly among the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) national security laboratories – Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL).