Year
2006
Abstract
Government can only do so much to dissuade the illicit trafficking and/or theft of key components used to construct weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The need for an industry self-regulation approach results from the nexus between terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, the A.Q. Khan illicit trade network, and IAEA Director General, Mohamed Elbaradei’s calls for an increased role of the nuclear industry in combating nuclear proliferation all serve as motivators for analyzing effective self-regulation approaches. Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1540 calls “…upon all States to…Develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws…” Industry could play an active role in promoting nonproliferation by ensuring that these materials are secure throughout the whole supply chain. This paper analyzes a continuum of self-regulation approaches for the nuclear industry to consider as a means to combat proliferation of WMDs.1 The continuum spans between options that are easier to implement, such as a Code of Conduct or Ethics that would serve as guidance around export control and protection of sensitive commodities on site, to more sophisticated approaches involving a formalized system of governance and institutional procedures and accountability. This analysis is based on reviewing several case studies of other industries that have pursued a self-regulation approach.2 These case studies were dissected to understand the trigger for each industry’s interest in self regulation, the approach used for promoting self regulation, the entity (e.g., industry NGO) responsible for implementing the approach, the program created, and the benefits to industry from the program. The industries included in this analysis were diamond, fertilizer, cement, and chemicals. It appears that the time is ripe to share these lessons learned with the nuclear industry to determine appropriate self-regulation approach(es) for it to consider.