Experience with In-Field Verification Exercises during the 2017 International Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material

Year
2017
Author(s)
Alena V. Zhernosek - Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Michael Whitaker - Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Andrea Braunegger-Guelich - International Atomic Energy Agency
Steven L. Cleveland - Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Manit Shah - Tetra Tech, Inc.
Susan K. Smith - Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Danielle Miller - United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration,
Abstract
State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs) are a fundamental component ofan effective international safeguards system. To help meet the need to establish, maintain, and strengthensuch nuclear material accountancy and control systems, the US Department of Energy/National NuclearSecurity Administration, in cooperation with the US Department of State and the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA), cosponsored the 21st International Training Course (ITC) on SSACs. This ITCwas hosted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory from April 24 to May 5, 2017. The course, offered every2 years, provides practical training on how to establish and maintain an effective state-level nuclearmaterial accounting and control system to satisfy both national and IAEA safeguards requirements.Throughout the 2 week course, the participants engaged in lectures, case studies, group discussions,exercises, demonstrations, and a visit to an operating nuclear facility led by Oak Ridge NationalLaboratory and IAEA safeguards experts. One of the main course modules focused on IAEA in-fieldverification activities and included four hands-on exercises to demonstrate and practice (1) the use ofequipment and techniques commonly used during IAEA verification; (2) procedures related to IAEAverification activities; and (3) the role of accountancy reporting documents in the context of theinspection process. The four exercises are based on a hypothetical scenario in a model State including anuclear facility that is inspected by the IAEA safeguards inspectors, thus providing a comprehensivehands-on training opportunity. The SSAC participants were divided into four separate groups. Each groupindependently performed a simulated routine inspection, a mock complementary access, and a simulatedreview of IAEA containment and surveillance equipment. The analysis of these verification activities wasused to form a conclusion on the model State’s declared nuclear activities. This paper describes the fourexercises related to the IAEA in-field verification activities. Results and observations are also presented,together with the conclusions drawn from the exercises.