Building Effective Systems for Nuclear Export Control: Controlling Transit Trade through the Baltics, Caucasus, and Central Asia

In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, worldwide attention to the threat of nuclear proliferation increased dramatically. Governments and regimes have responded by intensifying and expanding nonproliferation programs. Export controls which effectively regulate the use and supply of materials, equipment, and technology that could contribute to proliferation are an essential component of this response. Since 1995, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation (NA-242) has coordinated programs designed to strengthen export control practices worldwide through its International Nuclear Export Control Program (INECP). Early efforts provided assistance through technical partnerships with the three nuclear supplier states of the former Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Over the past year, INECP has expanded to the so-called “transit” states in the “southern tier” of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), like Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan, and to the Baltic countries. Building effective nuclear export control systems in these regions presents unique challenges because often there is little or no export control infrastructure and accompanying technical expertise. Since there are, however, customs and border guard organizations with responsibilities for all shipments crossing the border, INECP has started to train these enforcement organizations to raise their familiarity with strategic commodities, and has launched a parallel effort to establish and train indigenous cadres of nonproliferation technical specialists to effectively support export and border control efforts.