The Status of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Implementation of the U.S./IAEA Additional Protocol

On January 6, 2009 the U.S. submitted the instrument of ratification for the “Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America” (U.S./IAEA Additional Protocol) to the IAEA, bringing the U.S./IAEA Additional Protocol treaty into force. Entry-into-force of the U.S./IAEA Additional Protocol demonstrates the ongoing commitment by the United States to promote universal adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP). The AP is designed to supplement the Nonproliferation Treaty by increasing the authority and expanding the activities of the IAEA to strengthen the IAEA’s ability to detect nuclear material diversion and clandestine nuclear weapons development activities in non- nuclear weapon states. The AP requires information about nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities that do not involve nuclear material (and therefore are not reported under traditional safeguards) as well as information about manufacture and exports of certain equipment and material especially designed or prepared for nuclear use, additional information about nuclear sites already declared under comprehensive safeguards agreements, and information about mines and depleted and natural uranium. Since the ratification of the U.S./IAEA Additional Protocol, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has focused on working with NRC and Agreement State licensees to ensure appropriate reporting of information as required by the AP. This paper provides an updated status of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Implementation of the U.S./IAEA Additional Protocol, the impact on licensees and lessons learned during the first year of implementation.