Year
2005
Abstract
The 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement commits the US and Russia to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium drawn from excess military stocks. The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Duke Energy to irradiate the US excess plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel at its Catawba and McGuire nuclear plants. In 2003, Duke Energy applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for permission to irradiate four MOX lead test assemblies (LTAs), each containing 20 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, at Catawba Unit 1 to obtain data in support of eventual batch licensing of MOX fuel. NRC rules specify elements of the physical protection system that licensees possessing a Category I quantity (two kilograms or more of plutonium) must provide to prevent it from being stolen with \"high assurance\" by the design basis threat (DBT) adversary specified in 10 CFR 73.1(a)(2). The security system at Catawba did not meet all of those requirements. However, Duke asked NRC to be exempted from some of the Category I provisions, arguing that they were not necessary because the plutonium on site would be in the form of large, heavy fuel assemblies. The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (BREDL) challenged Duke's exemption request, arguing that Duke had not adequately demonstrated that it could protect against the Category I DBT in the absence of the additional antitheft requirements. BREDL was also concerned that an exemption of MOX fuel from Category I requirements would set a poor example for the protection of MOX fuel in Russia and other countries. A hearing on this issue was held in January 2005, and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) overseeing the case committed to providing a decision by March 2005 to allow the LTAs to be shipped to Catawba in time for its spring 2005 refueling outage. The hearing was closed and most of the documents in the case contained safeguards information. This paper will discuss, to the extent possible, the issues litigated in the hearing, the decision, and the implications of the decision for MOX programs in the United States, Russia and elsewhere.