Year
2011
Abstract
Advanced safeguards approaches for gas centrifuge enrichment facilities that incorporate unattended or remote monitoring systems are attractive complements to traditional Hexapartite Safeguards Project safeguards, and may reduce inspector effort and inspection costs. Elements of these approaches may be implemented together in an advanced safeguards approach that includes a safeguards system based on unattended and remote monitoring of the enrichment process. The safeguards system principally uses data from advanced enrichment monitors and accountancy scales to draw safeguards-relevant conclusions, but collects data from a passive neutron enrichment monitor and process load cells for confirmatory or backup measurements. Central to this safeguards system is the use of operator-owned or jointly-used process monitoring equipment that may be vulnerable to failure. The impact of system failure to both the operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be significant; in this study, we explore the frequency with which process data might be delivered to the IAEA to minimize the impact. Herein we identify the elements of process history that could be reconstructed following IAEA detection of system failure, strategies for detecting the failure of one or more components of the safeguards system, and possible Agency responses to system or component failure.