“Safeguardability,” the State - Level Concept and Advanced Safeguards

Year
2014
Author(s)
Joseph F. Pilat - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Kory W. Budlong Sylvester - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Chantell L. Murphy - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract
The concept of proliferation resistance utilized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and others recognizes both intrinsic (technological) and extrinsic (institutional) features. However, if there are benefits that may be realized from reactor s and other facilities designed to minimize proliferation risks, it is their coupling with effective safeguards and other nonproliferation measures that likely will offer the highest degree of proliferation resistance. In this context, there is growing in terest in improving the application of safeguards by developing facility designs that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards, reduce or eliminate diversion or misuse pathways or increase the prospects for detection along pathways by f acilitating advanced verification methods . However, safeguards are changing with the development of the State - Level Concept. Moreover, facility - specific safeguards are not in place for GenIV reactor designs, which will likely require technological advance s to meet the challenges posed. More broadly, the safeguards that will be integrated into designs will also need to respond to anticipated emerging and to unanticipated future challenges. “Safeguardability,” which encompasses safeguards by design (SBD), mu st then take into account the need for evolution in the safeguards system and in safeguards technologies. This will require strategic planning and cooperation between the Agency and Member States, and communication to designers for incorporation into new d esigns and, as appropriate, retrofitting old designs. The feasibility, costs, operational impacts and other possible effects of such approaches have not yet been fully assessed and need further analysis. This paper provides a framework for addressing these and other challenges to ensuring safeguardability as a key element of future proliferation resistance in the context of the development of the State - Level Concept, and to recognizing the role of safeguards technology advances and R&D strategies that will be needed to meet anticipated and unanticipated challenges.