The Role of Proliferation Resistance in Addressing Non-State Threats

Although dominated by international energy policies and strategies for dealing with carbon emissions, the prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power may depend on the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen proliferation resistance, along with strengthened international safeguards and other non-proliferation measures. The hope of finding a way to make the peaceful uses of nuclear energy resistant to proliferation appeared in the Acheson-Lilienthal report and has reappeared again and again in the history of nuclear power with little practical consequence. The concept of proliferation resistance does not mean “proliferation-proof.” As we look at non-proliferation efforts in the current threat environment, it is especially important to recognize that no proliferation resistance measures can prevent a state from acquiring nuclear weapons if it makes a decision to do so. Proliferation resistance can in principle increase the technical difficulty, cost and time needed by proliferators, and improve detection probability. It also has a role to play in addressing concerns that complex facilities cannot be safeguarded effectively and in reducing associated safeguards costs. These are important objectives, but they are limited. Although we have often thought about proliferation resistance measures primarily in terms of states—and there is a promising path ahead with reactors and other facilities designed to minimize proliferation risks coupled with effective safeguards and other non-proliferation measures—in terms of prevention they arguably have greater utility in dealing with non-state threats and need to be evaluated from that perspective. In this context, proliferation resistance could be a complement to current physical protection practices. This may lead to new approaches to nuclear security in the future. This paper examines the issue of the potential role of proliferation resistance, as it is now being discussed, to address non-state threats, and the prospects for developing new, realistic and cost-effective proliferation resistance measures that fully take into account these adversaries’ capabilities, motivations and strategies.