Year
2003
Abstract
Information analysis is positioned to play a significant role in the emerging, redesigned international safeguards system. With the Additional Protocol in force in 35 States (as of June 2003), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has undertaken the task of drawing conclusions regarding the completeness of States’ declarations. This conclusion is based in part on the results of Agency efforts to detect undeclared nuclear material or activities. To this end, first with its Strengthened Safeguards program and subsequently under Integrated Safeguards, the Agency has been seeking means for maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of its safeguards activities. As information analysis can be utilized both in States under INFCIRC/153 as well as those possessing INFCIRC/540 agreements, its potential applicability is quite broad. A number of possible roles for information analysis have been articulated in this context. To name a few, information analysis has been proposed for use in: providing direct detection capability for undeclared activities and facilities; targeting complementary accesses and other safeguards measures such as satellite imagery; inferring the existence of an active nuclear weapon program in a State; and possibly allocating IAEA inspection efforts. This paper will review and assess issues for information analysis raised by these and other roles.