Utilizing Risk Assessment in International Safeguards*

The development and use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has been instrumental in securing tangible improvements in a variety of fields, in particular nuclear reactor safety. These successes have led many practitioners to seek application in other fields. In this paper, the prospects for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to usefully apply PRA as part of its integrated safeguards program are explored. A preliminary analysis indicates that at a conceptual level there is promise for extending risk assessment into the realm of international safeguards. However, at a minimum the tools of application will necessarily have to be modified significantly to address acquisition paths and concealment scenarios. There is reason to believe that properly formulated and executed risk assessments could be used to produce effective and efficient safeguards approaches on a State-specific basis. This would be consistent with a flexible implementation of safeguards that sought to meet detection requirements commensurate with the attractiveness of a given acquisition path. However, using a risk concept that relies on assessments of the likelihood of a State to proliferate is problematic and could present a significant amount of institutional risk to the IAEA.