POTENTIAL MEANS for STIMULATING IMPROVED SAFEGUARDS IN THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS

Since the break-up of the former Soviet Union there have been grave worldwide concerns regarding effectiveness of material control and accountability for plutonium and highly enriched uranium in Russia. Indeed, recurrent widely-circulated public news of nuclear smuggling in eastern Europe causes suspicion that bomb-grade nuclear material may be vulnerable to insider theft from Russian facilities. How can the United States respond to help reduce this apparent risk? In addition to continuation of bilateral U.S.-Russian technical discussions on internal safeguards, the U.S. can take action to assure that the most relevant radiation detection equipment, including sensitive portal monitors and waste-screening devices, are available at Russian facilities. Moreover, via actions to improve U.S. domestic safeguards, the U.S. might indirectly stimulate constructive improvements in protection of bombgrade material in Russia. In fact, the U.S. can make demonstrative improvements in safeguards to counter insider threats at its own facilities, and can substantially enhance the public visibility of U.S. nuclear material control and accountability. The paper makes several concrete suggestions for changes to improve effectiveness of and public confidence in safeguards in the U.S., which might also stimulate interest abroad in improving internal safeguards systems.