Year
2004
Abstract
In the late eighties, the Military Application Division of the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) started to develop a research programme on nuclear proliferation to answer emerging threats in the context of the end of the cold war and the risks of nuclear weapons dissemination. This programme relies on in house skills of the CEA (nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear weapons fabrication, and advanced technologies) and on a network of institutes and high-tech companies. This large range of expertises allows in-depth analyses of all the steps and all the aspects of an undeclared nuclear weapon programme, the possible means of delivery and the technologies to detect the programme. These researches are carried out to the benefit of French authorities and to the support of international bodies (IAEA, CTBTO, INVO, UNMOVIC). Assessments of nuclear proliferation are achieved through the implementation of a methodology based on monitoring and verification technologies, some very sophisticated, remote detection and sensing, forensic detection, bio sensing, at different stages, from the early detection of the willingness of a proliferation capable state, the building of a proliferation scenario, the detection and assessment of clandestine programme to the confirmation and the follow up of an established military programme. All proliferations follow more or less the same sequences and require somehow the same type of detection techniques. The multidisciplinary development of the CEA in the field of advanced sensors, information technologies and biosciences has allowed us to extend globally the approach of nuclear proliferation to the biological, chemical and ballistic proliferation. The question of the states compliance, non compliance or rejection of international undertakings is also central to the analysis (safeguards, export control). An analysis of dual-use technologies (i.e gaseous ultra centrifugation) is also conducted. This work details this methodological approach and shows the interest to deal globally with different types of proliferation. Remarks: This paper comes from contributions of the Department of Analyse, Surveillance and Environment and the Division of the Material, Surveillance, Environment of the CEA/DAM.