Year
2012
Abstract
The INPRO (International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles) Collaborative Project to develop Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) builds upon the results of the INPRO Collaborative Project, PRADA (Proliferation Resistance: Acquisition/Diversion Pathway Analysis). The PRADA project focused on the processes associated with identifying and analysing plausible pathways for the acquisition or diversion of fissile material for a nuclear weapons program, using as a sample case the DUPIC (Direct Use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU) fuel cycle with an assumed diversion scenario. The application of the Generation IV international Forum (GIF) Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) approach for identifying and analysing acquisition/diversion pathways in PRADA demonstrated the feasibility of merging the two methodologies. To use the two methodologies in a complementary and consistent fashion, a shared definition of common concepts found in the INPRO Evaluation Parameters and GIF Measures/Metrics is required. Furthermore, the interface of relevant metrics/evaluation parameters of the two methodologies to assess the proliferation resistance and safeguardability need to be defined at different levels of evaluation (State, nuclear energy system, and facility). This paper presents the relevant metrics/evaluation parameters describing material and technical barriers against proliferation and those describing difficulty and detectability of diversion, including the difficulty to compromise safeguards measures, which will be the basis of developing a coordinated set of GIF/INPRO proliferation resistance and safeguards assessment tools.