Year
2007
Abstract
One of the key objectives of an effective nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) program is to address the threat posed by an active or passive “insider” who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion or theft of special nuclear material (SNM). An MC&A Functional Model has been developed using sound effectiveness and risk management practices to analyze the performance of MC&A duties at facilities possessing SNM. Emphasis is on achieving the objectives of approximately 150 “Fundamental Elements” in key areas ranging from categorization of nuclear material to establishment of Material Balance Areas (MBAs), controlling access, quality measurements of inventories and transfers, timely reporting of all activities, and detecting and investigating anomalies. The MC&A model identifies specific interfaces with security for timely response to alarms and reportable incidents of national security concern. The model was developed from historical experience in addressing anomalies by incorporating procedural and technical improvements. The model has the flexibility to incorporate new technology and address changing threats. The model is based on the detection of loss, theft, or diversion of Category I or II SNM. A graded approach may be used to determine the number of fundamental elements used for safeguarding all categories of nuclear material. The model provides a systematic method for analyzing MC&A systems; designing and assessing their constituent elements, identifying the importance of each and consequent degree of risk if an element is excluded or neglected without a compensatory element. The model can serve as a guide to promote consistency, assure thoroughness, and enhance the overall effectiveness and quality of MC&A programs for both national and international nuclear safeguards. In addition to documentation of a set of fundamental element descriptions and related diagrams, the MC&A System Effectiveness Tool (MSET) includes Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [1].