OPERATIONS MONITORING: EXPANDING THE ROLE OF SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY

Year
2003
Author(s)
Markku Koskelo - Canberra Industries
J. Smalling - Canberra Industries
Steven P. Kadner - Canberra Aquila, Inc.
Jeffery Chapman - Canberra Industries
William Roberts - Canberra Aquila, Inc.
Wendy Doyle - Canberra Aquila, Inc.
D. Miller - Canberra Aquila, Inc.
J. Beckes Talcott - Canberra Industries
B. Cosbey - Canberra Aquila, Inc.
Abstract
In recent years, safeguards authorities have come to depend on new technologies and techniques (e.g., remote data transmission, satellite technologies, and digital imagery) in their efforts to promote the regular exchange of accurate information about safeguards activities among parties to a given safeguards agreement. In addition to information sharing, Operational Monitoring through the use of advanced technologies can also serve as a mechanism to provide a measure of quality assurance for physical protection and material control activities. Anomalous events or unauthorized activities can be recorded and logged for later analysis and corrective action. In addition to meeting commitments derived from international safeguards agreements, there are new requirements for increased security. The events of the last two years have cast a new light on the perceived security of the world’s nuclear facilities and nuclear material. While concerns persist that some governments, i.e., North Korea, want to divert nuclear material from civil use to weapons programs, terrorist attacks in the U.S. and around the world have prompted new concerns of insider threats for nuclear sites. Safeguards authorities have come to depend on new technologies and techniques to counter these threats and to maintain their efforts in promoting operations monitoring of safeguards activities and facilitating the regular exchange of accurate information among parties to a given safeguards agreement. Two factors clearly contribute to the rise in technology use: (1) the degree of access required and permitted to all special nuclear material areas and (2) the prohibitive costs associated with physical inspections. In the past, the lack of technical capability to monitor and assure compliance with international nonproliferation agreements was a major obstacle to any treaty or agreement. This paper demonstrates that innovative use of technology provides a non-intrusive method of monitoring and facilitates the sharing of monitoring responsibilities. Specifically, it will illustrate how using advanced technologies in safeguards applications will significantly support and enhance physical protection and nuclear material control, while providing transparency and promoting mutual cooperation.