Antineutrino-Based Reactor Monitoring for Future IAEA Safeguards Applications

Year
2012
Author(s)
N. S. Bowden - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
A. Bernstein - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Thomas E. Shea - TomSheaNuclear Consulting Services
B. Cabrera-Palmer - Sandia National Laboratories
T. Classen - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
S. Kiff - Sandia National Laboratories
D. Reyna - Sandia National Laboratories
L. Kogler - Sandia National Laboratories
A. Erickson - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Abstract
Antineutrino monitoring has the potential to strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime. In September 2011, the first meeting of the Ad Hoc IAEA Antineutrino Monitoring Working Group was convened by the IAEA. The Working Group represents antineutrino physicists in 12 States and a range of safeguards experts from several IAEA Divisions. By bringing together experts in antineutrino detection technology with IAEA experts in reactor and downstream safeguards techniques, the Group seeks to develop a clear understanding of possible current and future applications of antineutrino detection for safeguards. In this paper, we briefly summarize the safeguards-relevant properties of antineutrino detection, discuss ongoing research into the technology, introduce the concept of an Antineutrino-Based reactor Monitoring System (ARMS), and describe how antineutrino monitoring might address current and future IAEA safeguards needs. We provide a simple example contrasting the use of ARMS and existing safeguards techniques in revealing hypothetical diversion scenario at a reactor. We conclude with suggestions for next steps to be taken by the Member States and IAEA in future Ad Hoc meetings and within the research portfolios of individual States.