A FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE TRANSPARENCY

Year
2005
Author(s)
Gary Rochau - Sandia National Laboratories
David York - Sandia National Laboratories
Takuya Kitabata - Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Naoko Inoue - Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute
Tracia Love - Sandia National Laboratories
Abstract
A key objective of the global deployment of nuclear technology is maintaining transparency among states and international communities. By providing an environment in which to exchange scientific and technological information regarding nuclear technology, the safe and legitimate use of nuclear material and technology can be assured. Many nations are considering closed or multiple-application nuclear fuel cycles and are subsequently developing advanced reactors in an effort to obtain some degree of energy independence. Proliferation resistance features that prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material and reduce the likelihood of diversion from the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle are critical for a global nuclear future. IAEA Safeguards have been effective in minimizing opportunities for theft and diversion; however, recent changes in the global political climate require implementation of additional technology and methods to ensure the timely detection of proliferation. For a variety of reasons, nuclear facilities are becoming increasingly automated and will require minimum manual operation. This trend provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring proliferation risk. This also means that facility operators may be able to acquire a more powerful tool to ensure and prove from hour to hour their legitimate use of nuclear materials and facilities. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to resist proliferation associated with these activities. Additionally, a framework designed to monitor processes will ensure the legitimate use of nuclear material. This research describes recent efforts to develop a methodology capable of assessing proliferation risk in support of overall plant transparency. The framework may be tested at the candidate site located in Japan: the Fuel Handling Training Model designed for the Monju Fast Reactor at the International Cooperation and Development Training Center of the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC).