Year
2004
Abstract
The Additional Protocol provides the IAEA with expanded information on the activities related to the nuclear program of the states as well as complementary accesses to verify this information and to solve questions and inconsistencies. The purpose of implementing these additional measures is to provide the Agency the assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and/or activities in the contracting states in addition to the conclusions obtained from the safeguards agreements already in force. The optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA including these from Additional Protocol and those of the comprehensive safeguards agreement is called Integrated Safeguards. In fact, the control tools introduced by the Protocol affect, and even modify, some basic safeguards parameters of the traditional safeguards. When the absence of nuclear materials and activities in a State, is assured, some safeguards parameters, as the timeliness, should be reexamined. This paper studies the traditional safeguards applied to a model of Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), and the impact of application of the measures from the Additional Protocol. In order to determine the best approach for the application of integrated safeguards, a basic approach for this kind of facility is compared with others less and more conservative approaches. This basic integrated safeguards approach for the PWR includes a timeliness of 18 months with the physical inventory verification – PIV conducted only during the refueling period and one or two unannounced inspection per accounting period, mainly for deterrence purposes. It also includes the use of temporary surveillance during the refueling period and seals for containment of the core and the equipment hatch, during normal operation.