Year
2004
Abstract
The safeguards objectives for enrichment facilities are the detection of the diversion of declared nuclear material and of facility misuse. The safeguard approach currently applied for commercial centrifuge enrichment facilities are based on the Hexapartite Project. However in the case of small centrifuge plants, limited inventories and restricted visual access to the cascades, the misuse scenarios seems to overcome the diversion strategies, particularly the unrecorded production of direct use material from LEU. In such cases access to cascade hall and F/W station is normally required on unannounced basis and at times not predictable by the state/operator. Due to the characteristic of the facilities controlled by ABACC, facility specific alternatives control schemes were developed and implemented. These alternatives safeguards approaches have covered the main safeguards requirements for R&D laboratories and centrifuges in cascade operation testing facilities. At present, studies are being carried out to apply safeguard controls to the initial steps of construction of one commercial facility. The conditions to apply the hexapartite approach are not met because the cascades are covered due to the operator’s requirement to protect sensitive information. The studies consider also alternative means for some measurement equipment that need to be developed. A concise analysis of some misuse strategies considered for small centrifuges plants is presented. The main control elements of some alternatives approaches are described based on unannounced inspections and transitory or permanent perimeter control in cases were the visual access to the cascades is restricted.