MONITORING THE SHUTDOWN OR CONVERTED STATUS OF EXCESS WARHEAD PRODUCTION CAPACITY

Year
2001
Author(s)
Oleg Bukharin - Princeton University
Abstract
Warhead assembly and disassembly activities in Russia will be phased out at two out of four existing facilities, including the Avangard plant in Sarov. Future nuclear weapons stockpile reductions could result in a closure of additional facilities in Russia and other nuclear weapons states. A transparency regime to monitor the shutdown status of excess warhead production capacities and non-production of new warheads could become an important element of existing and future arms control and nonproliferation initiatives, including the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cities Initiative, bilateral U.S.-Russian warhead dismantlement transparency, and multilateral deep nuclear arms reductions. This report explores possible political objectives of and approaches to monitoring former nuclear weapons assembly facilities with a focus on overhead surveillance and on-site inspections. It also discusses anticipated difficulties of implementing such a transparency regime. Main points of the analysis are illustrated by the examples of the Avangard plant (Sarov, Russia) as well as former and operating warhead assembly facilities in the United States.