NUCLEAR WEAPONISATION ACTIVITIES: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS?

An issue receiving increasing attention in light of recent cases is the role of IAEA safeguards with respect to nuclear weaponisation activities. IAEA safeguards agreements are written in terms of nuclear material. The manufacture of nuclear weapons obviously requires nuclear material, but many preparatory activities do not directly involve nuclear material. Some relevant non-nuclear materials and activities are “dual-use”, i.e. taken in isolation they do not necessarily indicate a clear intention to manufacture a nuclear weapon. The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon states to accept safeguards for verifying obligations under the Treaty “with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons”. The reference to prevention indicates that safeguards should act to pre-empt diversion, not wait until diversion has taken place. Although safeguards agreements establish procedures applying to nuclear material, the additional protocol recognises that information on certain items and non-nuclear materials can assist in drawing conclusions about nuclear material. This paper discusses issues such as: the IAEA’s legal authority as regards weaponisation activities; the IAEA’s detection capabilities for such activities; and how the IAEA should deal with indications of weaponisation. Also discussed is the important issue of appropriate handling of sensitive information, such as weapon design information or components in classified form.