DETECTION OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES: DOES THE IAEA HAVE THE NECESSARY CAPABILITIES?

Establishing an effective capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities is the greatest challenge facing IAEA safeguards. This has been a major focus of safeguards development over the last 15 years. This paper outlines what has been achieved and what more needs to be done. The paper looks at the following issues: What is the safeguards mission – what are safeguards trying to detect? And what conclusions can safeguards reach? Does the IAEA have the necessary tools – institutional and technical – to fulfil this mission? What more is required? With some exceptions, traditional safeguards have demonstrated a substantial capability to counter acquisition paths involving declared facilities - removal of nuclear material from declared facilities, and/or misuse of such facilities. Acquisition paths involving use of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared facilities are more problematic. Addressing these involves legal measures – improving the IAEA’s authority, especially through the Additional Protocol – and technical measures – improving detection techniques. While much has been achieved, this is an ongoing long-term program, and much more needs to be done. Now some are questioning whether the Additional Protocol is adequate, or whether the IAEA needs still greater authority. The Iranian situation illustrates the practical challenges in detecting undeclared activities, and possible deficiencies in the IAEA’s authority. The Iranian case also shows the need for clarity in the IAEA’s mission. What kind of activities is it reasonable to expect the IAEA to detect? And can the IAEA be expected to establish that a nuclear program is for exclusively peaceful purposes? These questions are central to both the future development and the credibility of the safeguards system.