Year
2003
Abstract
The technical objective of comprehensive safeguards—timely detection of diversion, and deterrence by the risk of early detection—is well established. The safeguards approaches for meeting this objective, however, have evolved substantially since INFCIRC/153 was introduced. The greatest area of change is the development of strengthened safeguards to counter possible undeclared nuclear activities. This is very much an ongoing effort: and the effectiveness and efficiency benefits of strengthened and integrated safeguards will not be fully realised until the Additional Protocol is adopted by every comprehensive safeguards state. Two principles are fundamental to the broad political consensus underlying safeguards—effectiveness and non-discrimination. Traditionally both these principles have been pursued through uniformity in safeguards implementation. Uniformity however has resulted in major inefficiencies. Some states maintain they are subject to excessive safeguards attention, to the detriment of effort in areas of greater proliferation concern; and that integrated safeguards concepts currently under development remain too formulistic. The argument against uniformity has also arisen in a different way—looking at particular problems, some national experts have favoured moving away from generic safeguards approaches to situationspecific solutions. A vital aspect of strengthened safeguards is broadening the range of information taken into account in safeguards. Greater use of information and other qualitative factors not only increases safeguards effectiveness, but also opens the way to incorporating expert judgment in safeguards decisions. This presents the opportunity to base safeguards effort on state-specific factors—differentiation is not discriminatory if based on transparent, well-documented, objective methodology. These developments raise a number of fundamental issues, including: what is the minimum level of safeguards intensity required to maintain credible conclusions; how to match safeguards effort to proliferation risk; and how to maintain generic safeguards approaches that permit appropriate flexibility? The key to optimising effectiveness and efficiency is to avoid rigid models