NON-PROLIFERATION – THE DPRK CHALLENGE

The DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) nuclear situation serves to illustrate a number of fundamental non-proliferation issues. First and foremost—and this might seem self-evident—the nonproliferation regime, and IAEA safeguards, are most effective in the case of states that are committed to non-proliferation principles. While both incentives and sanctions have a place in reinforcing commitments, the situation is clearly unsatisfactory if sanctions become the dominant factor. What is most important is to convince the state concerned that its own interests are best served by adherence to non-proliferation. The DPRK situation also demonstrates the importance of complementary non-proliferation measures, including restraining the spread of sensitive technology, and establishing proliferation-resistant technologies. The overwhelming majority of states have reached the conclusion that pursuit of nuclear weapons would be contrary to their national interest, and have joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. It appears that in 1985, when it joined the NPT at the urging of the former Soviet Union, the DPRK had reached no such conclusion—which explains why the safeguards agreement required under the NPT took six years to conclude, and why the IAEA experienced a lack of cooperation almost from the outset. It is a challenge to the entire international community to retrieve this situation. With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps more could have been done to persuade the DPRK of the value of the NPT in terms of its own security concerns. While incentives and sanctions—“carrots and sticks” —will be part of any solution, unless the DPRK becomes genuinely committed to non-proliferation principles the nonproliferation regime—and the IAEA’s vital verification role—will continue to encounter difficulties. We can design a stronger safeguards approach—e.g. to counter the possibility of undeclared enrichment activities—but both initial acceptance and ongoing cooperation by the DPRK will depend on an appreciation that its interests are best served by non-proliferation. Constructive engagement is an essential aspect of progress—Australia has been actively involved at the practical level, through dialogue and training on safeguards issues, as well as in diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation. This paper reflects the views of the author and does not necessarily represent Australian Government policy.