FMCT VERIFICATION – PRECEDENTS FROM OTHER REGIMES

The proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has as its objective the cessation of fissile material production for nuclear weapons. Credible verification, to provide assurance that all the participants are honouring treaty commitments, will be fundamental to the establishment and successful implementation of the FMCT regime. In essence, in the great majority of States that have accepted comprehensive safeguards, this is what IAEA safeguards already provide. Although there are very close parallels between IAEA safeguards and the verification regime required for FMCT, the latter would not be identical to comprehensive safeguards. First, the objectives of the two verification regimes, seemingly very similar, are not identical. Second, the cost of verification on the comprehensive model in the nuclear-weapon States and other States with substantial unsafeguarded nuclear programs would be prohibitive. Further, FMCT may require additional confidencebuilding measures, such as challenge inspections. Another major factor will be the concern to protect national security-sensitive information. Thus there is the need to develop for the FMCT a new verification regime, drawing not only on IAEA safeguards, but also looking at procedures and mechanisms from other verification regimes, particularly that of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This paper discusses basic verification aspects of the FMCT including inter alia routine and non-routine verification activities, managed access, and challenge inspection mechanisms. The paper also discusses issues related to the structure of the formal instruments to be involved, and the role of the verification agency in information collection and analysis. The paper reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent Australian Government policy.