Year
2006
Abstract
Implementation of the Additional Protocol, formulated to enhance detection of undeclared materials and activities, has created a need for the development and application of new safeguards means and methods. A combination of safeguards elements should be examined that balance efficiency and effectiveness in a performance based approach. The Additional Protocol impacts both the scope and depth of IAEA responsibilities where safeguards begin with mining activities at the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Not only active mines but also mines that are closed down are of concern. To understand the magnitude of the issue, in the United States alone there are approximately some 1000 abandoned uranium operations spread across a relatively large geographic area. It is obvious that a verification scheme based on frequent complementary access would stress available Agency resources. Various approaches could be used to verify the status of mining operations ranging from on-site access to the deployment of sophisticated technologies such as: - video surveillance; - ground sensor systems (acoustic or seismic); - sealing; - airborne survey; - satellite imagery. The overall safeguards approach and the degree of technology deployment should be based on analysis of all available data including open source information from individuals, organizations, and government agencies.