Year
2003
Abstract
The new world paradigm that resulted from the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, as well as recent events in Iraq and North Korea underscores the necessity and importance of securing nuclear facilities in order to prevent diversion of materials for secret weapons programs or terrorist purposes. To address this critical global situation, the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and the Generation IV Program (GEN IV) have provided extensive recommendations for intrinsic (technical) and extrinsic (political) measures, as well as first steps to establish a respective assessment methodology that will enhance the proliferation resistance of future nuclear energy systems. However, the development and implementation of intrinsic features are likely to prove costly and time consuming, raising doubts that Generation IV reactors – while sufficiently proliferation resistant – might prove not to be economically competitive with other energy sources. The following paper will explore to what extent complementary and financially less straining extrinsic features can be used to support proliferation resistance, as called for in the assessment methodology, while keeping costs on the technical side economically acceptable. Specifically, the paper will demonstrate how Operations Monitoring (OM) can provide an additive layer of Protection, as well as serve as a management tool to enhance performance of personnel, and as an information sharing system on a bilateral or multilateral level. It will also demonstrate how OM is suited to cover containment and surveillance (C/S) responsibilities within the IAEA Safeguards regime. The paper concludes by giving further recommendations on developing the assessment methodology, which will focus on balancing intrinsic and extrinsic features from an economic perspective.