COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS - EXPERIENCE AND PERSPECTIVES

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) mission under the “Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards” is to detect undeclared nuclear materials, facilities, and activities. Complementary access is the key element introduced by the Additional Protocol. It is important to acknowledge that complementary access should only be carried out in a non-mechanistic manner. The paper will report on experience gained at German facilities and sites and draw some conclusions. Especially, practical problems have emerged in connection with sites, where there are decommissioned facilities whose status has to be confirmed by IAEA inspectors. This issue is of great concern and complexity. A further issue that is of common interest in many industrialized states relates to the conversion of sites from nuclear to non-nuclear activities. In particular, new research and development and commercial programs are characterized by sensitivities and must be protected during complementary access. In carrying out complementary access, the IAEA will use appropriate hand-held instrumentation that is already available or under development, in order to help confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities without revealing commercially sensitive information, which the facility operator wants to see protected. Finally, the paper outlines a perspective for possible future instrumentation, which can support IAEA inspectors in performing their important mission to verify compliance without hampering research or commercial activities during complementary access.