The Additional Protocol and the Road to Integrated Safeguards - Japan's Experience

Japan, the only nation in the world that have suffered atomic bombing, has been firmly committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, attaching great importance to non-proliferation efforts in order to contribute to the enhancement of global and regional peace and stability. Ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, she placed herself under obligation, as a non-nuclear weapons state, not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Further, Japan has been upholding the NPT regime and exerting her efforts in materializing efficient and effective IAEA safeguards. Since the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991, Japan is actively involved in the program for strengthening and streamlining IAEA safeguards both within the framework of INFCIRC/153 and through additional measures under the Additional Protocol (AP). Being one of the first countries with an extensive peaceful nuclear fuel-cycle program, she ratified her AP on December 16, 1999. For the sake of early realization of integrated safeguards (IS), the Japanese Government is currently working closely with the Agency and making active contribution towards the establishment of IS and its implementation in Japan. This paper describes Japan’s experience in bringing the AP in force, including various legal and institutional arrangements for the preparation of its ratification, and actual experience in its implementation, e.g. the provision of expanded declarations and facilitating complementary accesses. Some issues and lessons learned in the course of AP implementation will also be provided. It further describes Japan’s efforts towards the establishment of IS as well as some expectations from it.