International Safeguards Recommendations for The Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR)

Year
2011
Author(s)
James E. Doyle - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Chantell L. Murphy - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Brian D. Boyer - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Brian M. Fane - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract
India has created a unique nuclear energy research and development program making nuclear reactors using all three fissionable materials: 235U, plutonium and 233U. A major catalyst for this approach stems from the country’s almost 30-year-long isolation from international nuclear trade. In response, they have created an indigenous program based on the abundant reserves of thorium, which constitute 25% of the world’s total reserves. Anil Kakodkar, chair of India’s Atomic Energy Commission (IAC) told members at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) General Conference in Vienna in September 2009 that the nation has largely completed the design of a 300MWe, vertical, pressure tube type, boiling light water cooled, and heavy water moderated Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR). A mix of 233U, which will be converted from thorium by previously deployed and domestically designed fast breeder reactors, and plutonium, will fuel the reactor. There will also be an export version of the 300MWe AHWR that will use 19.75% low-enriched uranium (LEU) instead of plutonium, called the AHWR-LEU. Given the new and ambitious nature of India’s three-stage nuclear energy program, a thorough and accurate proliferation assessment of all stages should be conducted. The objective of this assessment is to demonstrate how advanced international safeguards approaches, including those based on safeguards by design, process modeling and simulation, process monitoring, nuclear material measurements, and remote and unattended monitoring, may be used to maximize the effectiveness of future safeguards for the AHWR and AHWR-LEU. The product of this analysis will include a technical description of both of the reactors highlighting non-proliferation strengths and weaknesses and safeguards recommendations for both the domestic and export reactors. This work contributes to the mission of the IAEA international safeguards planning activities and promotes safe and secure civil nuclear energy and technology.