Verification Challenges for Future Nuclear Weapons Reductions

On April 5 2009 President Barak Obama declared that under his leadership the United States would “seek the security of a world free of nuclear weapons.” In the same month President Obama and Russian President Medvedev committed to a continuing process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions. A year later the two presidents signed a new START treaty and reaffirmed their pursuit of world free of nuclear weapons, agreeing that there would eventually be follow-up negotiations to reach lower limits.1 In addition, the US Nuclear Posture review released April 6, 2010 commits the US to initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures.2 It is impossible to predict the specific directions that US-RF nuclear arms reductions will take over the 5- 10 years. Additional bilateral treaties could be reached requiring effective verification as indicated by statements made by the Obama administration. There could also be transparency agreements or other initiatives (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) that require monitoring with a standard of verification lower than formal arms control, but still needing to establish confidence to domestic, bilateral and multilateral audiences that declared actions are implemented. The US Nuclear Posture Review and other statements give some indication of the kinds of actions and declarations that may need to be verified in a future bilateral or multilateral context. Several elements of the nuclear arsenals not previously subject to direct limits could be specifically reduced. For example, it is likely that both strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads (deployed and in storage), warhead components, and aggregate stocks of such items could be accountable under a future treaty or transparency agreement. In addition, new initiatives or agreements may require the verified dismantlement of a certain number of nuclear warheads over a specified time period. Eventually procedures for confirming the elimination of nuclear warheads, components and fissile materials from military stocks will need to be established.