From START to FINISH? Strategic Challenges Remaining After a START Follow-on

Year
2009
Author(s)
James E. Doyle - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract
The achievements of current U.S.-Russian negotiations towards a new Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are likely to be modest in terms of both numerical weapons reductions and political benefits. This is because the treaty objectives are evolutionary rather than transformational. Measures required to achieve truly deep reductions in nuclear stockpiles and changes in force posture reflecting reduced roles for nuclear arsenals in national security strategies lie outside of the current negotiating framework as described by government leaders from both sides. Even a successful treaty will leave cold-war style nuclear triads in place in both nations with hundreds of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and thousands of active and reserve nuclear warheads.1 Despite its limited objectives the conclusion of a START follow-on treaty will restore continuity to legally-binding, verifiable bilateral nuclear arms reductions and help both countries regain leadership of the global nuclear security and nonproliferation agenda. This outcome can strengthen bilateral security relations and set the stage for a successful 2010 review conference for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Moreover, Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 committed to a process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions beyond the next START treaty and to the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons