Year
2013
Abstract
The recent accident in Japan at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant is likely to generate challenges to applying effective safeguards on the damaged core material. Similarly, the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) Unit 4 created many challenges for long-term safety, safeguards and security considerations. Some of the safeguards issues that had to be overcome at ChNPP will be faced at Fukushima Dai-ichi. This paper reviews the methodology used to develop the safeguards approach at ChNPP, and identify the major components with application to Fukushima Dai-ichi. The ChNPP Shelter safeguards approach required a unique nuclear material verification situation. The explosive force and ensuing high heat and radiation of the accident damaged and scattered the nuclear material making accurate estimates of nuclear material amounts and their location difficult to reconcile. The development of safeguards followed a methodology driven by information and analysis that has applications at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Initially, the safeguards team collected open source information on the Chernobyl accident and extracted safeguards relevant data to form a picture of the status of the facility. The safeguards team then worked with Ukraine to clarify the collected information and refine the qualitative status of the Chernobyl Unit 4 material strata and locations. This process provided a basis for prioritizing via cost-benefit analysis, the possible verification methods and complementary measures for IAEA safeguards.