Year
2011
Abstract
Most arms-control-treaty-monitoring scenarios involve a host party that makes a declaration regarding its nuclear material or items and a monitoring party that verifies that declaration. If this verification requires the use of a measurement system, it is probable that the measurement system will be developed specifically for the intended treaty-monitoring use. Such a system needs to be trusted by both parties; I term the trust-building process as “certification” for the host party and “authentication” for the monitoring party. In a traditional development scenario, one party designs, builds, and certifies (or authenticates) the measurement system; the other party then authenticates (or certifies) the system built by the first party. A significant difficulty in this type of development is achieving certification and authentication simultaneously. In an alternative development scenario, that of joint development, both parties develop the design together, cooperate on fabrication and testing, and obtain systems based on the agreed-on design. In this paper, I will discuss the differences between joint development and traditional development (in terms of cost, resource requirements, international perception, trust by both parties, etc.) and the advantages and disadvantages of using the joint development of measurement systems for treaty verification uses. I will draw on my experiences with the Russian “AVNG” attribute measurement system that was described in a series of presentations at the 2010 Institute of Nuclear Materials Management meeting in Baltimore. I will conclude that the joint development process has significant advantages, particularly in the design phase of a project. However, I will note that joint development is not a panacea and, in particular, does not directly address the question of “Is the measurement system working?”