Year
2011
Abstract
For large throughput nuclear facilities, such as commercial reprocessing plants, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of diversion. Process monitoring (PM) is used in safeguards as an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). Process monitoring consists of utilizing process control measurements to detect abnormal plant operation. Process control measurements are those used by the operator to control the chemical and/or physical processes. Examples of process control measurements in reprocessing plants include (1) feed and product flow rates by measuring the change in tank volume versus time, (2) concentration measurement of nonnuclear material reagents, and (3) process temperatures. Significant challenges for the future use of process monitoring include greater access to the plant operator’s process control data (enhanced PM), leveraging the development of new process control instrumentation and/or development of new independent IAEA instrumentation to be used for advanced process monitoring, and reducing inspector time required to evaluate process monitoring data since process monitoring for the future will likely include additional operator data. Enhanced process monitoring can be implemented near-term in existing facilities and advanced process monitoring can be implemented in the long-term in new facilities