THIRD INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS (NGS3): SYNOPSIS OF THE SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN REACTOR WORKING GROUP CONCLUSIONS

Year
2011
Author(s)
Kory Budlong-Sylvester - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Kory Budlong-Sylvester - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Brian Boyer - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Brian Boyer - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Scott F. Demuth - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Scott DeMuth - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Phillip C. Durst - Durst Nuclear Engineering & Consulting Inc.
Phillip C. Durst - Durst Nuclear Engineering & Consulting Inc.
Paul Y. Pan - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract
The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was held in Washington, DC on 14.15 December 2010 and focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which \\international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.. The United States Department of Energy has initiated a project by way of its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to establish a global norm for the use of SBD. The NGSI SBD program is being developed in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA, while taking into account the IAEAfs SBD achievements and future plans. The NGSI program is pursuing the establishment of a SBD global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example by way of its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper will report on the discussion topics and present details of the final recommendations of the NGS3 Reactor Working Group. This working group had representation from industry, government, and former IAEA inspectors from around the world. The working group discussed how to make reactor design more amenable to both domestic and international safeguards requirements. Among the key issues considered, the group concluded that the IAEA and nuclear industry should consider an improved means for identifying and tracking nuclear fuel from manufacture to disposal; that new facility designs need to take into consideration the space, utility, and other requirements for installing IAEA seals, surveillance systems, servers, and conduit for on-site storage of and possible remote transmission of safeguards data; the need exists to verify and track mixed oxide fresh fuel and CANDU spent fuel in unattended mode and the IAEA should define these specific requirements and make them available to the broader international safeguards community and nuclear industry through publications and especially through joint forums that share the latest developments in safeguards technology and approaches with nuclear facility operators and facility designers.